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Focusing on the most liquid segment of the European CDS market, this paper studies the impact 
of key standardization reforms. We document that the introduction of an upfront fee to 
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higher CDS prices. This relation holds after accounting for well-known determinants of 
spreads, suggesting a separate funding channel driven by the greater capital intensity of trading. 
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Standardization is a key element in the on-going regulatory reforms of over-the-counter 
(OTC) markets. Contract standardization is a process that allows matching of cash flows in 
terms of amount and maturity.1 Indeed, contract standardization is essential for several aspects 
of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) trading, such central clearing and centralized trading.2 
Moreover, standardized contracts facilitate netting and trade compression (Vause (2010)) and 
are necessary to attain a certain degree of liquidity on centralized trading venues (Oehmke and 
Zawadowski (2017)). However, standardized contracts may not be able to meet specific risk 
management and trading objectives, for which agents rely on the customized contracts of OTC 
markets (Stulz (2010)). While the literature has studied extensively the impact of central 
clearing on the functioning of derivative markets,3 the impact of reforms aimed at contract 
standardization has been relatively less studied. In this paper, we address this issue in the 
context of the regulatory reforms aimed at improving standardization of CDS contracts and 
study whether these reforms have affected the cost to insure against the default of an entity in 
CDS markets.  
Following the excessive risk taking and poor practices that emerged during the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), a series of reforms aimed at promoting and facilitating standardization 
in the CDS markets have been introduced. One of the most notable reforms affecting the CDS 
market is the set of regulatory changes collectively known as the CDS Small Bang, introduced 
 
1 Standardization of CDS contracts can also involve default-contingent payments, restructuring clauses, and the 
events that trigger default (see Vause (2010) for more details). 
2 The multilateral netting of positions via central counterparties requires standardized contracts, and a large share 
of contracts has to move to a central clearing counterparty for it to achieve the multilateral netting benefits sought 
by the regulators (IMF (2010)). 
3 Important contributions to the literature examining the impact of central clearing on the functioning of OTC 
markets include: Duffie and Zhu (2011), Duffie, Scheicher, and Vuillemey (2015), Acharya and Bisin (2014), 





in June 2009 in Europe. As standardisation increases the share of contracts cleared centrally 
(Vause (2010)), the reduction in counterparty risk should be reflected in lower costs of 
insurance against default in CDS.4 However, to standardize the heterogeneous cash flows of 
CDS contracts, the Small Bang has introduced fixed coupons together with an upfront fee 
payable at the start of the contract, whereas prior to the reform, CDS contracts did not carry 
any initial capital requirements. Thus, this regulatory change has made trading in CDS markets 
more capital intensive. As dealers sustain additional capital costs, the required risk premium to 
deal in CDS may increase under certain circumstances, increasing the cost to enter CDS 
contracts. Indeed, looking at the cost of investment-grade CDS contracts through time, we note 
that average CDS prices are higher in the post-reform period, and although CDS spreads have 
steadily declined following the peaks observed during the GFC and subsequent European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, they have never reached the lows of their pre-GFC levels (Figure 1). A 
similar pattern holds true for CDS liquidity (Figure 2). Moreover, the greater capital 
requirements, coupled with declining dealer profitability caused by the unusually low market 
volatility (IMF (2015a), Callsen and Hill (2018)), may encourage greater concentration 
amongst dealers.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of the CDS Small Bang standardization reform 
on CDS markets, focusing on single-name investment grade companies included in the Markit 
iTraxx Europe index, the most liquid segment of the CDS market in Europe. The European 
market provides a unique setting to address this question. For example, compared to the US 
reforms, European regulation allows for greater flexibility in terms of contract specifications.5 
 
4 As insurance contracts against the default of an entity, CDS prices reflect the probability of default of the entity, 
as well as the default risk of the counterparty of the CDS contract, the so-called counterparty risk. Moreover, CDS 
prices comprise a risk premium capturing subjective factors such as dealer risk aversion (Siriwardane (2019)). 
5 A similar set of regulatory changes known as the CDS Big Bang was implemented in the US CDS market in 
April 2009. The US reforms defined only two fixed coupon rates of 100 bps and 500 bps, whereas the Small Bang 





Moreover, European markets have experienced a crisis episode, the European debt crisis, after 
the protocol changes. Thus, focusing on European CDS markets we can assess the impact of 
the reforms across both relatively volatile and calm periods. Having documented higher CDS 
prices in the post-reform period compared to the period preceding the GFC, we concentrate on 
dealers and study why the changes introduced by the Small Bang affect CDS prices. In this 
respect, we study the introduction of the initial capital charge and its impact on CDS prices, 
focusing on different periods characterized by high and low volatility regimes. We further 
investigate this relationship by differentiating between instances in which the protection buyer 
bears the initial capital requirement, as opposed to their counterparty, in the context of dealers 
positioning themselves, on aggregate, as net protection buyers. Finally, following evidence in 
the literature about an inconsistent appraisal of credit risk for financial entities (Arora, Gandhi, 
and Longstaff (2012)), we study the effect of the initial capital charge on CDS price changes 
separately for financial and nonfinancial entities, and explore whether the relationship is 
industry contingent.   
We find that, on average, the cost of insurance using CDS contracts has increased 
following the implementation of the Small Bang standardization reform. We relate this effect 
to the implications of the regulatory changes for dealers capital requirements and inventory 
management. Specifically, we document that higher initial capital charges positively impact 
CDS spread changes, resulting in higher CDS prices. The introduction of the initial capital 
charge is interpreted as an additional funding cost for the parties engaging in CDS transactions, 
creating a potential friction to trade in CDS. An initial capital charge increases dealers risk 
aversion leading to higher CDS prices. We document this effect while controlling for well-
known determinants of CDS spreads, including firm-specific volatility and liquidity factors, 
and macroeconomic variables capturing market conditions and sentiment (Ericsson, Jacobs, 





(2013)). To further confirm the funding channel, we show that the impact of the regulatory 
change is present especially when dealers, as net protection buyers, are more likely to bear the 
initial capital cost. Moreover, analysing different market conditions, we document that the 
impact of the fee on CDS prices is stronger in the most recent period following the European 
debt crisis when market conditions were relatively more benign. Finally, we document that the 
‘capital requirements – CDS price’ relation is industry contingent. Financials are indeed the 
only industry sector, out of the five industries in which entities in the iTraxx Europe index are 
categorised, for which CDS prices do not increase due to the introduction of the initial capital 
cost. On the one hand, in line with the findings of Arora et al. (2012), this may suggest that 
counterparty risk is not priced for financials which points towards a greater benefit of 
standardisation in reducing counterparty risk. On the other hand, this may indicate that trading 
CDS written on financial entities is seen by dealers as essential to the good functioning of the 
market and, in conjunction with the high liquidity of financial firms CDS which are the most 
widely traded among industry sectors, the initial capital charge is seen as a relatively small 
barrier to trading.  
We make three main contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the nascent 
literature on the impact of post-GFC regulatory reforms focused on standardisation of OTC 
markets. Most studies focus on the impact of standardisation on liquidity. To this end, Wang, 
Wu, Yan, and Zhong (2021) and Daures-Lescourret and Fulop (2021) study CDS 
standardization reforms in the US and Europe, noting a positive impact on liquidity. However, 
unexpected consequences of the reforms have also emerged, including increased illiquidity for 
the CDS contracts with higher upfront capital charges (Wang et al. (2021)). In this paper, we 
provide evidence that CDS spreads widen due to the payment of the upfront fee following the 
adoption of the Small Bang reforms even after accounting for CDS liquidity and volatility, 





engaging in CDS contracts. Secondly, we add to the literature examining the effects of funding 
constraints on financial markets (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), He and 
Krishnamurthy (2013), Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014), He, Kelly, and Manela (2017), 
Siriwardane (2019)). Studying CDS specifically, Siriwardane (2019) documents a sizeable 
impact of dealers capital shocks on CDS prices that is comparable in magnitude to that of 
standard credit factors. We contribute to this literature by identifying substantial regulatory 
spillovers on to dealers capital constraints. The requirement of payment of the initial upfront 
fee leads dealers to operate closer to their funding constraints, increases their risk aversion, and 
translates to higher CDS prices. Lastly, by documenting that the fee payable at the inception of 
a CDS contract following the Small Bang reforms acts as an additional funding cost which 
positively impacts CDS spread changes, increasing CDS prices, this paper contributes to the 
literature investigating the determinants of CDS spreads (e.g. Ericsson et al. (2009), Corò et al. 
(2013), Annaert, De Ceuster, Van Roy, and Vespro (2013), Galil, Shapir, Amiram, and Ben-
Zion (2014), Tang and Yan (2017), Anderson (2017)).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II details the institutional 
background, focusing on the regulatory reforms affecting the CDS market, dealer positions and 
market concentration. Section III describes the data, sample and variable construction, and 
summary statistics. Section IV presents the empirical methods employed and results. Section 
V outlines the robustness checks performed on our results. Section VI concludes.  
  
II. Institutional Background 
 
Regulatory reforms in the post-GFC period have limited dealers proprietary trading and 
increased capital requirements for dealing in OTC markets. As a result, dealers have become 





currency, and commodity markets (IMF (2015b)). This reduced market making activity is 
identified as one of the main causes of episodes of price dislocations in key markets (IMF 
(2015b)). In October 2014, the US Treasury yield dropped by 37 bps to quickly recover in what 
is known as flash rally.6 This extreme price move took place in one of the most liquid markets 
in the world. This episode is not isolated; other highly liquid markets have experienced extreme 
price moves, such as the Swiss franc crash in January 2015 and the Bund tantrum in April 2015 
(IMF (2015b)). Just as regulatory changes in the wake of the GFC curbed dealers proprietary 
trading and increased capital requirements unexpectedly creating risk for financial stability, 
regulatory reforms to promote contract standardization may have unintended consequences.  
 
A. Regulatory Changes in the CDS Market 
Following concerns regarding the role of CDS during the GFC, the CDS market has 
been subject to a number of regulatory changes aimed at increasing the standardisation of 
contracts and improving the transparency, efficiency and stability of the market.7 However, as 
outlined below, despite their acknowledged benefits, CDS market regulatory changes have also 
oftentimes had unintended negative consequences. 
One of the first major regulatory changes concerning the CDS market was the 
introduction of the CDS Big Bang and CDS Small Bang reforms on April 8th, 2009 and June 
20th, 2009 impacting the American and European CDS markets, respectively. An important 
development brought about by these reforms is the standardisation of coupon payments, 
whereby fixed coupons together with an upfront fee payable at the start of the contract are 
introduced. In particular, the CDS Small Bang conventions restrict coupon rates to 25 bps, 100 
 
6 See IMF (2015a) for a discussion of the role of structural changes in the Treasury market, specifically on the 
change in dealers business model from market making and risk warehouse to brokerage and risk distribution.  
7 See Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014) for a detailed description of regulatory reforms in the 





bps, 500 bps and 1000 bps.8 Hence, following the Small Bang reforms, CDS contracts require 
the exchange of an upfront fee at the initiation of the contract to settle the present value of the 
difference between the CDS spread and the fixed coupon (Wang et al. (2021)). The difference 
is paid by the buyer (seller) if the fixed coupon is lower (higher) than the actual CDS spread. 
Prior to the 2009 Small Bang reform, there was no upfront payment at the initiation of the 
contract, coupons were based on the CDS spread, and the contract had zero net present value.9 
Exploring the CDS Big Bang and Small Bang reforms, Wang et al. (2021) and Daures-
Lescourret and Fulop (2021) find an improvement in aggregate CDS liquidity following the 
reforms, though the improvement is greatly reduced for contracts that incur larger upfront fees 
(Wang et al. (2021)). Moreover, Gündüz, Ongena, Tümer-Alkan, and Yu (2020) document that 
CDS buying costs decrease for non-dealer banks following the CDS Big Bang and Small Bang 
protocol changes, enabling such banks to extend more credit to affected firms and improve 
hedging. Separately, investigating the CDS Big Bang protocol changes, Narayanan and 
Uzmanoglu (2018) document a sharper decline in firm value for investment-grade firms 
compared to high-yield entities with traded CDS following the Big Bang. Finally, Danis (2017) 
uses the CDS Big Bang reforms as a natural experiment and focuses on the restructuring of 
distressed firms finding that participation rate among bondholders is lower if the company has 
CDS traded on its debt, while Gelpern and Gulati (2012) explore whether following the Big 
Bang, CDS contract interpretation has become more contextualist rather than textualist in 
nature.10  
 
8 In the US market, the CDS Big Bang reforms defined only two fixed coupon rates of 100 bps and 500 bps.  
9 A second feature of these protocol changes relates to the standardisation of cash settlements in contractual CDS 
agreements following a credit event, the settlement price being decided through an auction mechanism (Augustin 
et al. (2014)).  
10 Credit Derivatives Determination Committees set up by ISDA following the CDS Big Bang to help market 
participants reach decisions on issues such as whether a credit event has occurred or whether an auction should 
be held state an interpretative approach to contract adjudication, with members performing their obligations ‘in a 
commercially reasonable manner’, while being ‘sensitive to the broader context of the CDS market’ (Gelpern and 
Gulati (2012), p. 364). However, contrasting this contextualist mission statement, the contract interpretation 





In addition to the Big Bang and Small Bang reforms, the Dodd-Frank Act of July 2010, 
and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) of September 2010 have been 
introduced in US and European markets, respectively, to fulfil the commitment of G20 leaders 
from September 2009 of centrally clearing all standardised OTC derivatives contracts by the 
end of 2012. These policies focus on mandating central clearing, improving the monitoring of 
risks and concentrations of exposures, mitigating counterparty risk through the high 
capitalisation of clearing houses, improving market transparency and liquidity, increasing 
competition, and facilitating the multilateral netting of transactions at the end of each day (see 
Loon and Zhong (2016) and Augustin et al. (2014)). Indeed, several papers have highlighted 
the benefits of these reforms for reducing counterparty and systemic risk, as well as improving 
liquidity (e.g., Acharya and Bisin (2014); Loon and Zhong (2016)). However, other studies 
have also pointed towards potential downsides of these reforms, such as a trade-off between 
increased multilateral netting and decreased bilateral netting of contracts (Duffie and Zhu 
(2011)), increased collateral demands following central clearing through a central counterparty 
(Sidanius and Zikes (2012)), and potential increased systemic risk and costs of risk 
management (McBride (2010)). 
 
B. CDS Market Evolution, Dealer Positions and Concentration 
Same as other OTC markets, the CDS market is a two-tier market, with a dealer-
customer tier where smaller banks and other financial institutions deal with a market maker, 
and an interdealer segment where dealers trade among each other to adjust their inventory 
(Peltonen, Scheicher, and Vuillemey (2014)). Following the regulatory reforms impacting the 
CDS market in the aftermath of the GFC, notional amounts outstanding of CDS have decreased 
 
‘emphasised fidelity to contract text as distinct from economic substance of the transaction’(Gelpern and Gulati 





sharply from over $44.9tn at the end of 2008 to just over $7.5tn at the end of 2019 according 
to BIS data.11  
The CDS market is also increasingly concentrated, with the drivers of this trend to be 
found in regulation and market conditions. On one hand, bank capital requirements, and the 
leverage ratio in particular, have increased the capital cost of market making (IMF (2014), 
Callsen and Hill (2018)). On the other hand, low CDS volatility has reduced market makers’ 
profitability. These conditions have led to an overall decline in the liquidity provision of market 
makers, with some dealers exiting the market (Callsen and Hill (2018)).12 Atkeson, Eisfeldt, 
and Weill (2013) argue that the high concentration observed in the CDS market is largely due 
to the fixed entry costs faced by new entrants, enabling only few large banks with large risk 
exposures (that can be hedged) to enter the market as dealers and provide intermediation, while 
medium-sized banks participate comparatively less in the OTC market and act as customers. 
Moreover, these large banks can support large notional CDS exposures by netting positions 
and holding collateral only proportional to their net exposures (Bolton and Oehmke (2013), 
Atkeson et al. (2013)). Relying on position data for global sovereign and financial single-name 
CDS, Peltonen et al. (2014) find that as of year-end 2011 only 18% of traders are net protection 
sellers, while 82% of traders are net buyers. Moreover, Siriwardane (2019) noted that by 2016 
the top five buyers and top five sellers account for around half of aggregate net buying and net 
selling, respectively. DTCC data shows that between 2008 and 2019, on aggregate, four of the 
largest CDS dealers (Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan and Citigroup) are net 
protection buyers, as shown in the CDS positions data presented in Table 1.13  
 
11 The interdealer trading activity has also been declining steadily, mainly due to the increasing share of centrally 
cleared dealer transactions (Aldasoro and Ehlers (2018)). 
12 A report by the FSB (2017) report refers to market intelligence suggesting a decline in the number of dealers in 
OTC markets. Drawing on market surveys, IMF (2010) shows that balance sheet capacity and regulatory changes 
are major factors constraining market making activity in bond markets.   
13 Data on the amounts of CDS protection written and purchased of four large CDS dealers (Morgan Stanley, 
Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and Citigroup) has been collected from the TIW reports from the DTCC between 





[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We note that aggregate amounts of CDS protection bought and sold by the four largest 
dealers have steadily decreased through time, with the aggregate amounts of CDS bought and 
sold in 2019 being more than six times smaller than those seen in 2008, in line with the general 
decrease in notional amounts of CDS outstanding observed after the GFC. Throughout our 
sample, the aggregate CDS position of the four largest dealers account for between 33.7% and 
45.4% of the total gross notional amount of CDS bought and sold, indicating a high degree of 
concentration in the market. Figure 3 displays the share of aggregate notional amounts of 
bought and sold CDS by the four major dealers as a proportion of the total notional amount of 
CDS bought and sold over time, confirming that concentration in the CDS market has steadily 
increased following the GFC. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
III. Data and Variables 
A. Data Collection and Sample Construction 
We source CDS spread mid, bid, and ask quotes for CDS contracts written on European 
investment-grade companies included in the Markit iTraxx Europe index from Bloomberg. The 
Markit iTraxx Europe index comprises of 125 investment-grade entities with the most liquid 
single-name CDS in the European market.14 The constituent list includes 100 non-financial 
firms and 25 companies that operate in the financial sector. 
 
14 Previous studies using data from the iTraxx Europe index include Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and 
Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) which examine the determinants of the CDS indices, Berndt and Obreja (2010) 
who use index data to construct a factor mimicking economic catastrophe risk, Junge and Trolle (2015) who 
construct a new measure of CDS market liquidity and analyse whether liquidity risk impacts expected CDS 
returns, and Hui, Lo, and Lau (2013) who explore option implied correlation between iTraxx Europe Financials 





Our dataset includes monthly, end of month, observations spanning a period of fourteen 
years, from January 2006 to December 2019.15 Therefore, the sample covers a period of around 
three and a half years (41 months) prior and ten and a half years (127 months) after the CDS 
Small Bang. The entities in the dataset are all the companies included in Markit iTraxx Europe 
index throughout our sample period and for which we could source CDS and stock data from 
Bloomberg. To preserve the number of entities in our cross-section as well as maintain the 
most liquid CDS in our sample, we keep only reference entities that have not been excluded 
from the Markit iTraxx Europe index for more than ten index rolls throughout our sample 
period.16 We focus on CDS contracts with a five-year maturity as these contracts are the most 
liquid and widely traded (Annaert et al. (2013)). All contracts are denominated in Euros and 
have a Modified-Modified restructuring clause, the most common restructuring rule in Europe. 
The final sample consists of 17,375 (104 firms) monthly observations.  
 
B. Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
1. The Upfront Fee 
Computing the upfront fee requires two components, the distance between the CDS 
spread and the coupon rate, and the prevailing funding cost in the market. Since in our sample 
we cannot directly observe the upfront fee size and coupon rate, we follow Wang et al. (2021) 
and use the coupon rate closest to the CDS spread to obtain the distance between the spread 
and the coupon.17 Thus, for each reference entity 𝑖 in month , we construct a variable ( 𝐼 𝑖, ) 
 
15 The sample start date is chosen due to relatively low CDS data availability prior to 2006.  
16 The European Markit iTraxx index constituent list is reviewed with respect to liquidity and investment grade of 
entities every six months, with one index roll occurring in March and one in September. Throughout the time 
frame of the study, the constituent list of the European iTraxx index changes are minor. This observation is also 
highlighted by Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) who find only negligible effects of index roll changes on spread 
changes.     
17 In our sample, the coupon closest to the spread is in 5357 cases (40.56%) at 25 bps, in 7639 cases (57.84%) at 
100 bps, in 207 cases (1.57%) at 500 bps and in 5 cases (0.03%) at 1000 bps, highlighting the investment grade 





measuring the minimum difference, in absolute terms, between the CDS spread of firm 𝑖 in 
month  and the four possible coupon rates, as shown in equation (1).        𝐼 𝑖, = min(|  𝑖, − |, |  𝑖, − |, |  𝑖, − |, |  𝑖, − |)        
To measure the funding cost per unit of payment prevailing in the market, we use the 
European TED spread, measured as the difference between the 3-month Euribor rate and 3-
month German Government BuBill rate.  We choose to use the European TED spread as the 
funding cost measure for our main analysis as Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski (2017) 
convincingly show that European bank conditions, proxied through the European TED spread 
are better indicators of cross-border bank flows, especially outside of the GFC, compared to 
US banking conditions. However, in Section V.C we show that our results are robust to using 
the US TED spread as the funding cost measure. We obtain end-of-month closing values of the 
European TED spread from Bloomberg, noting a great deal of variation, ranging from lows of 
just over 2 bps to highs of 282 bps during the most turbulent part of the GFC.  
Following Wang et al. (2021), we define the upfront fee ( 𝑖, ) as the product between 
the distance to the closest coupon ( 𝐼 𝑖, ) and the funding cost prevailing in the market 
(  𝑝 𝑎 ), as shown in equation (2).                                                    𝑖, = 𝐼 𝑖, ×  𝑝 𝑎                                                         
We note that the mean fee at the 25 bps coupon is 7.02 bps, at the 100 bps coupon this 
is 16.75 bps, at the 500 bps coupon this is 66.82 bps, while at the 1000 bps coupon the mean 
fee is 60.38 bps. As expected, we see that the fee increases, in absolute terms, with the coupon 
rate.18 In our sample, the average fee relative to the CDS spread equals 15.8% which indicates 
that the fee is also economically significant. The fee is paid by the protection buyer (seller) 
 
18 The lower mean fee for the 1000 bps coupon can be attributed to a very low number of observations at this 





when the spread is higher (lower) than the closest fixed coupon. In our sample, the protection 
buyer bears the upfront fee in 62.4% of cases.  
Figure 4 presents the variation of the average fee observed in our post-Small Bang 
sample over time. We note that the mean fee hovered around 20 bps in the period following 
the Small Bang and prior to the inception of the European Debt Crisis, then spiked sharply 
during the European Debt Crisis period, reaching levels of 95 bps in November 2011.19 The 
large spike in the fee during the European Debt Crisis can be attributed to the increases in 
funding costs during this period. The mean fee then fell considerably to averages of around 10 
bps in the period following the European Debt Crisis. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
2. Control Variables 
The control variables included are drawn from the literature and consist of well-
documented firm-specific and macroeconomic determinants of CDS spreads and spread 
changes (see Ericsson et al. (2009), Tang and Yan (2010), Tang and Yan (2017), Corò et al. 
(2013)). As control variables, we therefore include firm-specific variables such as CDS 
illiquidity (CDS bid-ask spreads), 30-day realized CDS spread volatility, stock return, stock 
bid-ask spread (scaled by the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes), 30-day realized stock 
volatility, as well as macroeconomic variables such as the 10-year risk-free rate prevailing in 
Europe, the slope of the yield curve (the difference between the 10-year and 2-year Euro-area 
Government bond yields), and the level of the VSTOXX index to measure implied volatility.20 
 
19 We follow Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2018) and Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2019) and 
consider the most severe part of the European Debt Crisis to last from January 2010 until July 2012 when the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program was launched which indirectly recapitalized European banks 
and reestablished market stability.  
20 Following Pires, Pereira and Martins (2015), we focus on the absolute rather than the relative bid-ask spread as 
the authors convincingly show that the absolute measure should be used in the context of the CDS market. 
Contrasting this, stock bid-ask spreads are scaled by the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes, as commonly used in 





To assemble our control variables, we obtain CDS bid and ask quotes as well as stock level 
data and macroeconomic series from Bloomberg.  
 
3. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the dataset. Panel A shows that the mean and 
median CDS spread throughout our sample is 85.99 bps and 66.46 bps, respectively. Panel B 
and Panel C display summary statistics for the pre-Small Bang and post-Small Bang samples, 
respectively.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Comparing the CDS spread levels in the two regimes, we note that mean (median) 
spreads are larger in the post-Small Bang period, increasing from 75.40bps (45.69 bps) to 89.33 
bps (70.56 bps). We also note that CDS liquidity has deteriorated on average after the Small 
Bang, CDS mean (median) bid-ask spreads reaching levels of 6.09 bps (5.30 bps) in the post-
Small Bang period, compared to 5.97 bps (4.10 bps) in the pre-Small Bang sample.  
 
C. CDS Spreads and Liquidity Around the Small Bang: A Short and a Long-Term 
View 
Figure 1 Graph B shows the evolution of CDS spreads using a 6-month window before 
and after the Small Bang event. We note that spreads have steadily decreased from levels of 
around 200 bps observed in March 2009 and have continued their decreasing trend after the 
Small Bang event of June 2009, reaching levels of around 76 bps at the end of the 2009. 
However, looking at the long-term picture of average spread behavior throughout our whole 
sample, displayed in Figure 1 Graph A, we see that cross-sectional average spreads not only 





but they do not approach their average pre-GFC level until the end of our sample.21 This is 
further evidenced by the smaller value of average CDS spread levels observed in the period 
preceding the Small Bang reforms (74.3bps), compared to that following the Small Bang 
(89.3bps), considering that the former period also includes the most turbulent part of the GFC. 
We argue that spreads have not declined to their pre-GFC levels, also in part, due to the increase 
in capital intensity brought about by the introduction of upfront fees for transacting CDS. 
A similar behaviour to that of spreads is also seen in terms of CDS illiquidity.  
Consistent with the objectives of the Small Bang regulatory changes of improving 
transparency, standardization, and market liquidity, average CDS bid-ask spreads have steadily 
declined after the GFC and consequently, liquidity has improved in the short-run after the Small 
Bang reforms were enacted (see Figure 2 Graph B). However, taking a long-term perspective, 
we note that cross-sectional average CDS liquidity has not reached the average pre-GFC level 
following the Small Bang (see Figure 2 Graph A).    
 
IV. Results 
This section details the empirical results of our estimations examining the effects of the 
upfront fees introduced following CDS Small Bang convention changes on CDS spreads. In 
the empirical analysis, we focus on examining spread changes, rather than spread levels for 
two reasons. Firstly, by using spread changes, we alleviate any non-stationarity concerns 
around CDS spreads, and independent variables.22 Moreover, as Ericsson et al. (2009) note, 
spread differences should be harder to explain than spread levels. Therefore, by performing our 
 
21 Following Corò et al. (2013) we consider the start month of the GFC to be April 2007. 
22 Previous studies investigating the determinants of CDS spread changes in the European market (Corò et al. 
(2013)) and in the U.S. market (Galil et al. (2014)) found evidence of non-stationarity in spread levels, whereas 





estimations in first differences, we perform a stricter test of the effects of the upfront fees, as 
well as of other CDS determinants, on CDS spreads.23 
 
A. The Effect of the Small Bang Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads  
After documenting that CDS spreads are higher on average following the Small Bang 
reform, we next turn to a more formal analysis to identify the potential sources of this increase 
by focusing on the newly introduced initial charge. To assess whether the upfront fees brought 
about by the CDS Small Bang reforms increase CDS spreads after accounting for known firm-
level and macroeconomic determinants of CDS spreads, we estimate the model presented in 
equation (3):             ∆  𝑖, = 𝑖 + ∆ 𝑖, + (∆ 𝑖, × ) + ∆ 𝑖, + ∆ + 𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,           
In equation (3) ∆ 𝑖,  is the change in the CDS spread for trading CDS contract i on 
month t, 𝑖 is a constant, ∆ 𝑖,  represents the change in the upfront fee on contract i on month 
t,  is an indicator variable that equals one after the Small Bang event of June 2009, and zero 
otherwise, ∆ 𝑖,  is the first difference of the set of firm-level control variables described in 
section III.B.2, ∆  is the first difference of the set of macroeconomic variables described in 
section III.B.2, and 𝑖 are the firm-level fixed effects.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Results are presented in Table 3. The model presented in equation (3) is first estimated 
on the whole time-series sample, without the inclusion of the terms ∆ 𝑖,  and ∆ 𝑖, ×  in column (1) to examine the determinants of CDS spreads without the 
inclusion of the upfront fee effects. Consistent with prior findings in the literature, we find that 
CDS spreads increase with stock and CDS volatility, stock and CDS illiquidity, and market 
 
23 Previous studies exploring the determinants and commonality of CDS spread changes include Ericsson et al. 





implied volatility, and decline with stock returns and the risk-free rate. In column (2), we 
estimate the full version of equation (3) and find that the coefficient of the interaction term ∆ 𝑖, ×  is 0.14 and statistically significant at the 10% level (t = 1.96) highlighting the 
effect of the upfront fee on spread changes.  
Next, we present results of the estimation of equation (3) in the sub-samples identifying 
the post Small Bang period (column (3)), the period between the Small Bang and the end of 
the European Debt Crisis (column (4)) and the post-European Debt Crisis period (column (5)). 
We find that after the Small Bang, CDS spreads increase significantly with the fee (column 3). 
In particular, a 1% increase in the fee is associated with a 0.28% increase in CDS spreads. The 
effect is significant across the two subperiods post Small Bang (columns 4 and 5), but it is 
especially large in the period following the European Debt Crisis (August 2012 – December 
2019), highlighting the increased impact that the Small Bang fee has on widening CDS spreads 
in recent times. This finding also suggests that the effect of the fee is not directly related to the 
turbulent market episodes related to the crisis. In this latest period, a 1% increase in the fee is 
associated with a 0.74% increase in CDS spreads.24  
Importantly, the widening of CDS spreads due to the payment of upfront fees is 
observed after controlling for known determinants of CDS spreads, including CDS illiquidity 
and volatility. Therefore, we propose that the exchange of upfront fees between CDS buyers 
and sellers increases CDS spreads through a funding channel that is separate from the liquidity 
or volatility transmission channels.25  
 
24 We note that results of the model presented in equation (3) are robust to an alternative specification whereby 
all independent variables, and not just the fee variable, are interacted with the dummy variable capturing the period 
following the Small Bang reforms. Results are presented in the Appendix in Table A1. As the interaction terms 
between the other independent variables and the Small Bang dummy are largely insignificant, and the results with 
respect to the upfront fee are qualitatively similar, we choose to report the results of the model presented in 
equation (3) for parsimony.  
25 In their study of the effects of the introduction of upfront fees following the CDS Big Bang and CDS Small 
Bang reforms on CDS liquidity, Wang et al. (2021) find that CDS bid-ask spreads increase due to the exchange 






B. Asymmetric Effects of the Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads  
1. The Effect of the Buyer Paying the Upfront Fee 
In this section we establish whether an asymmetric effect of the upfront costs on CDS 
spreads occurs, dependent on whether the upfront fee payer is the CDS buyer or seller. As 
shown in Section II.B, the four large CDS dealers are, on aggregate, net protection buyers in 
every year following the CDS Small Bang. Therefore, we posit that the effect of the upfront 
fee on CDS spreads is larger when the CDS contract buyer pays the upfront fee as this would 
constitute an additional funding cost that, on aggregate, CDS dealers would have to bear to 
engage in CDS transactions. To test this, we first construct an indicator variable 𝑦 𝑖,  which 
takes the value of 1 if the CDS spread on contract i in month t is larger than the closest fixed 
coupon, and 0 otherwise. We then estimate the regression model presented in equation (4).  
      ∆ 𝑖, = 𝑖 + ∆ 𝑖, + ∆ 𝑖, × 𝑦 𝑖, + ∆ 𝑖, × 𝑦 𝑖, ×+ ∆ 𝑖, + ∆ + 𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The estimation results are reported in Table 4. Examining the coefficient of the triple 
interaction term ∆ 𝑖, × 𝑦 𝑖, × , presented in column (1), we find a point estimate 
of 0.28 that is statistically significant at the 1% significance level (t = 2.72). This provides 
evidence of the asymmetric effect of the protection buyer paying the upfront fee following the 
Small Bang reforms.  
Focusing on the post-Small Bang period, in column (2) the point estimate of the 
coefficient on the term ∆ 𝑖, × 𝑦 𝑖,  is 1.17 (t = 3.83) which is more than four times 





column (3) of Table 3. This suggests that the impact of the fee is especially large when the 
buyer pays. In columns (3) and (4) we isolate the period between the Small Bang and the 
European Debt Crisis, and the post-European Debt Crisis period, respectively, and we find that 
the coefficients of the interaction term ∆ 𝑖, × 𝑦 𝑖,  are 0.94 (t = 3.31) and 2.74 (t = 
8.89), respectively, indicating that the asymmetric effect of the buyer paying the upfront fee on 
CDS spreads is considerably larger in the post-European Debt Crisis period (August 2012 – 
December 2019).  
In conclusion, we document that the impact of the fee on CDS spreads is especially 
strong when dealers are more likely to bear this additional funding cost at the onset of the 
contract. We also show that this effect is economically meaningful and strong in the most recent 
period.  
2. Examining Financial and Non-Financial Companies Separately 
In this section, we investigate whether the impact of the fee on CDS spread depends on 
the industry of the underlying entity. It is important to note that significant differences between 
financial and non-financial firms exist, among others, in terms of regulation, funding methods, 
corporate governance, agency problems, capital structure, leverage levels, and calculation of 
distance to default (De Haan and Vlahu (2016) and Duan and Wang (2012)). Furthermore, inter 
alia, Alexander and Kaeck (2008) provide evidence that several variables that affect CDS 
spreads of non-financial entities do not influence spreads of companies operating in the 
financial sector.   
Therefore, to check whether the effects of the upfront fees on CDS spreads differ when 





according to whether they operate in a non-financial or financial industry, and estimate 
equation (5) separately on the two groups of firms.26                               ∆  𝑖, = 𝑖 + ∆ 𝑖, + ∆ 𝑖, + ∆ + 𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,         
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 presents the results. Columns (1) and (2) explore the effects of the upfront fees 
on CDS spread of financial entities for the whole time-series sample and post-Small Bang 
sample, respectively, while columns (3) and (4) explore the effects of the upfront fees on CDS 
spreads of non-financial entities for the whole time-series sample and post-Small Bang sample, 
respectively. We note that increases in upfront fees widen CDS spreads when examining the 
whole time-series sample for both financials and non-financials alike, with the point estimate 
of the coefficient of the term ∆ 𝑖,  being slightly larger for financial entities compared to 
non-financials (0.17 (t = 3.39) compared 0.14 (t = 5.15)). Interestingly however, when focusing 
on the post-Small Bang sample, we find that changes in upfront fees do not significantly 
increase CDS spreads for financial entities, while the effect on non-financial entities almost 
doubles in magnitude, the point estimate of the coefficient of the term ∆ 𝑖,  becoming 0.37 
(t = 5.51).  
3. Is the Effect of the Upfront Fee on Spread Changes Industry Contingent?  
The result from Section IV.B.2 seems surprising and calls for a deeper investigation 
into whether the impact of the Small Bang upfront fees on CDS spreads is contingent on the 
industry sector in which the underlying entity resides, firstly to explore whether there are other 
industries where the relationship does not hold, and secondly to check that the results found for 
the sub-sample including financial entities only are not primarily driven by the smaller sample 
size. To examine whether the effects of the upfront fee on CDS spreads are captured differently 
 





across different industry sectors, we use the following procedure. First, we group firms in the 
iTraxx Europe index into one of five industry sectors as indicated by Markit. The five 
categories are: Automobile & Industrials, Consumer Products, Energy, Financials, and 
Telecommunications, Media & Technology. We then estimate the model presented in equation 
(6) separately for all time-series samples.  
                 ∆  𝑖, = 𝑖 + ∑ 𝑘 ∆ 𝑖, × 𝐼 𝑒𝑐 𝑜 𝑘5𝑘= + ∆ 𝑖, + ∆ + 𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,    
In equation (6), 𝐼 𝑒𝑐 𝑜 𝑘  represent dummy (indicator) variables taking the value of one if 
company 𝑖 is in sector 𝑘, and zero otherwise.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Regression estimation results are reported in Table 6. Column (1) presents results for 
the whole time-series sample, while columns (2), (3) and (4), present results for the post-Small 
Bang sample, the sample covering the post-Small Bang period until the end of the European 
Debt Crisis, and the post-European Debt Crisis period, respectively. Examining the whole 
sample results, we find that the upfront fee significantly increases CDS spreads for all 
industries except consumer products. However, looking at the post-Small Bang period, we find 
that upfront fees increase spreads for all individual industry sectors except financials, providing 
further support to our previous results indicating that upfront fees increase CDS spreads of 
companies in the post-Small Bang period, with the exception of financial entities. Moreover, 
this alleviates any concerns that the results presented in Table 5 are due to lower number of 
financial entities, compared to non-financials. Upon further inspection of columns (3) and (4), 
we find that the result concerning financial companies is mostly due to the period between the 
Small Bang date and the end of the European Debt Crisis, as the relationship between the 
upfront fee and CDS spreads is significant and larger in magnitude in the post-European debt 





Although puzzling, since, in theory, the relationship between the Small Bang upfront 
fees and CDS spreads should not be dependent on the industry sector in which the underlying 
entity activates, as the fees would have to be exchanged between the counterparties in the 
transaction irrespective of the underlying entity, this result echoes previous findings of Arora 
et al. (2012) who show that CDS dealers’ counterparty risk is priced when trading CDS written 
on entities from all industry sectors, except for financials. An implication of this result may be 
that the standardization benefits of the Small Bang reforms clearly outweigh the downside of 
the need for increased capital to engage in CDS transactions in the case of trading CDSs written 
on financial entities, due to a negligible impact of counterparty risk on spreads. Moreover, this 
result may suggest a market expectation that CDS dealers would not fail, even if large financial 
firms become distressed (Arora et al. (2012)). Potentially, this could further indicate a too-big-
to-fail argument, whereby spreads of large financial entities would not increase due to the 
upfront fee as these financial companies could be considered essential to the functioning of 
financial markets and would thus be likely to receive assistance and/or bailouts in case they 
become vulnerable.  
 
V. Robustness checks 
A. Do Spreads Increase Due to the Upfront Fees at the Market Level?  
Having documented that CDS spreads widen as a result of the introduction of upfront 
fees at the company level, we now turn our attention to replicating our main findings at the 
market level, by using cross-sectional averages of our dependent and independent variables, 
respectively. Hence, we estimate the regression presented in equation (7).  





In equation (7), ∆𝑀𝑎 𝑘   is the first difference of the average market-wide CDS spread 
in month t,  is a constant, ∆𝑀𝑎 𝑘   is the first difference of the average market-wide 
upfront fee in month t,  is an indicator variable that equals one after the Small Bang event 
of June 2009, and zero otherwise, and ∆  represents first differences of the set of market-wide 
control variables described in section III.B.2. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Results are presented in Table 7. We find compelling evidence supporting our previous 
firm level results. Upfront fees significantly increase CDS spreads at the market level. We find 
that the coefficient of ∆𝑀𝑎 𝑘   is positive and statistically significant in all estimations. 
The coefficient of the interaction term ∆𝑀𝑎 𝑘  ×  is 0.34 and is also statistically 
significant. Moreover, analyzing post-Small Bang subsamples, we show that the effect is 
almost three times stronger following the European Debt Crisis.  
B. Using Only CDS Big Bang Fixed Coupons in the Calculation of the Upfront Fee 
An interesting difference between the CDS Small Bang and CDS Big Bang reforms is 
that, in Europe, the Small Bang introduced four fixed coupons (25bps, 100bps, 500bps and 
1000bps), while in the US only two fixed coupons (100bps and 500bps) have been adopted. 
However, reports suggest that the European CDS market has shifted towards using the 100bps 
and 500bps coupons almost exclusively, with corporate investment grade swaps likely trading 
at 100bps, while high yield credits trade with a 500bps strike (see ECB (2009)). This shift is 
another indicator of a general move towards greater standardization as it brings CDS contracts 
traded in the European market in line with the standardized North American contracts.  
To check whether our results are robust to the use of only (or primarily) the 100bps and 





of the absolute difference between one of the two fixed coupons and the CDS spread of firm i 
in month t, as shown in equation (8):                                    𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = min(|  𝑖, − |, |  𝑖, − |)                
As in the main analysis, the fee ( 𝐵𝐵𝑖,𝑡) is computed as the product between the 𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝑖,𝑡 and the European TED spread measure. We then proceed to re-estimate the model 
presented in equation (3) using 𝐵𝐵𝑖,𝑡 as the measure of upfront fees.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Results are presented in Table 8. We find that using the two-coupon specification the 
‘positive upfront fee – CDS spread’ relation is even stronger, with both the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the regression coefficient of the term 𝐵𝐵 ×  increasing. On the 
one hand, this result lends further to support to our central finding that spreads increase with 
upfront fees. On the other hand, this suggests that the inclusion of an additional two coupons 
in the European market has had little to no effect on the impact of upfront fees on spreads.27 
 
C. Using the US TED Spread to Capture Funding Costs 
In the main analysis we have computed the upfront fee using the European TED spread 
measure, following the findings of Cerutti et al. (2017) indicating that the European TED 
spread measure is a better measure capturing cross-border bank flows outside of the GFC, 
compared to its US based measures. However, much of the funding of global banks is obtained 
in US dollars.28 Consequently, we re-estimate our results from Section IV, using the US TED 
 
27 The addition of the two additional fixed coupon rates (25bps and 1000bps) in the Small Bang compared to the 
Big Bang had as primary purpose the improvement of liquidity in the European CDS market, by allowing a greater 
reduction in the upfront fees that need to be exchanged between parties.   
28 This is true even for some non-US global banks, albeit less so for European banks (see Aldasoro, Ehlers, and 





spread, measured as the difference between the 3-month USD Libor rate and the 3-month US 
Treasury yield.  
Results are presented in the appendix in tables A2 - A5. We find qualitatively similar 
results to the prior analysis, with the statistical significance generally improving, with the 
estimates of the point coefficients of the variables capturing the effect of the upfront fee on 
CDS spreads being up to three times larger in some specifications. In conclusion, we document 
that CDS spreads increase with the fee irrespective of the funding currency.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
The CDS Small Bang reforms have improved standardization in the European CDS 
market. However, since the adoption of the reforms, the cross-sectional average level of CDS 
spreads has been higher than the average pre-crisis level, even after accounting for the crisis 
episodes that took place. Looking at the specific features of the reforms, one of the primary 
regulatory changes introduced was the standardization of coupons. Specifically, in order to 
standardize the cash flow of CDS contracts the reform has introduced an upfront fee needing 
to be exchanged between market participants that engage in transacting CDS contracts. We 
document that the adoption of this new rule has had unintended consequences.  
Using data on single-name investment grade constituents of the Markit iTraxx Europe 
index between January 2006 and December 2019, we show that the introduction of upfront fees 
has created a market trading environment that is more capital intensive. This, in turn, has had 
the effect of widening CDS spreads. Moreover, we document that this effect is asymmetric and 
dependent on whether the buyer or seller of credit protection pays the fee and on whether 
dealers are on aggregate net CDS buyer or sellers. To this end, we show that during the post-
Small Bang sample period, major dealers have been on aggregate net protection buyers. In 





the upfront fee. We also document that the relationship between upfront fees and CDS spreads 
is industry dependent. We evidence that the relationship is positive and significant following 
the Small Bang reforms for all industries, except for contracts written on financial entities, 
potentially indicating that the standardization benefits clearly outweigh the downsides when 
trading CDSs on these reference entities. Finally, we conduct a series of robustness tests. To 
this end, we find that our results are replicated at the market level using cross-sectional averages 
of our variables, that results are replicated if market participants use only the two fixed coupons 
(100bps and 500bps) introduced in the Big Bang reforms, instead of the four coupons 
introduced in the European CDS market, and that results are robust to choosing a funding cost 
measure based on the US market, instead of the European market. 
Our research highlights the complexities of standardization reforms aimed at 
standardizing highly heterogeneous contracts, traditionally exchanged in bilateral OTC 
transactions.  In the specific case of CDS, we show that the introduction of an upfront payment 
needed to standardize the cash flow of the contracts has increased the funding costs for dealers 
in this segment of the OTC market. Does this additional capital charge affect dealers’ ability 
to engage in market making activity in CDS? We show that it makes CDS trading more 
expensive, as it has increased CDS prices. It remains to be seen whether the benefits of the 
centralization of trading and clearing encouraged by the greater contract standardization will 
outweigh this additional cost and improve market functioning and financial stability. Episodes 
of liquidity fragility and price dislocation in key financial markets have highlighted the 
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Figure 1: CDS Spreads – A Short-Term and a Long-Term View 
Figure 1 plots average monthly CDS spreads. Graph A plots average spreads across the whole 
sample (January 2006 – December 2019). Graph B displays spreads in the period 6-month prior 
to 6-month after the CDS Small Bang event (January 2009 – December 2009). Spreads 
represent end-of-month values and are averaged across entities. The grey vertical line indicates 
the month when the Small Bang reforms were enacted (June 2009). The grey horizontal line 
from Graph A represents the average CDS spread observed in the pre-GFC period (January 
2006 – March 2007). Data is obtained from Bloomberg.  







06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  
















Figure 2: CDS Bid-Ask Spreads – A Short-Term and a Long-Term View 
Figure 2 plots average monthly CDS bid-ask spreads. Graph A plots average bid-ask spreads 
across the whole sample (January 2006 – December 2019). Graph B displays bid-ask spreads 
in the period 6-month prior to 6-month after the CDS Small Bang event (January 2009 – 
December 2009). Bid-ask spreads represent end-of-month values and are averaged across 
entities. The grey vertical line indicates the month when the Small Bang reforms were 
introduced (June 2009). The grey horizontal line from Graph A represents the average CDS 
bid-ask spread observed in the pre-GFC period (January 2006 – March 2007). Data is obtained 
from Bloomberg.  
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Figure 3: CDS Market Concentration 
 
Figure 3 plots aggregate total notional amounts of CDSs bought and sold by four major dealers 
in the CDS market (Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Citigroup) as a 
proportion of total notional amounts of CDSs bought and sold. Amounts of CDSs bought and 
sold by dealers are obtained from TIW of DTCC and Group Annual Reports. Aggregate 















































































































Figure 4: Evolution of Upfront Fee Over Time 
 
Figure 4 presents the monthly cross-sectional average upfront fee (in bps) exchanged between 
the parties involved in the CDS transaction over time. The fee is calculated as shown in 






























Table 1 – Major CDS Dealer Aggregate Positions 
Table 1 reports the aggregate amounts of CDS protection purchased and written, as well as 
corresponding gross and net total aggregate amounts of CDS transacted of the four large CDS 
dealers (Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and Citigroup) between 2008 and 2019. 
The last column represents the total net amount of protection transacted as a proportion of the 
total amounts of protection bought and sold. Aggregate notional amounts are expressed in USD 
billions. Data is obtained from the TIW reports, the DTCC and Group Annual Reports. 
Year 
Protection purchased Protection written Total Net 
Net / Total 
(1) (2)  (1) + (2) (1) - (2) 
2008 13556.70 12905.82 26462.52 650.88 2.46% 
2009 9519.41 9141.12 18660.53 378.28 2.03% 
2010 8517.72 8221.47 16739.19 296.26 1.77% 
2011 8857.48 8624.87 17482.35 232.61 1.33% 
2012 8109.38 7954.03 16063.41 155.36 0.97% 
2013 6732.96 6578.63 13311.59 154.33 1.16% 
2014 5405.15 5240.59 10645.74 164.56 1.55% 
2015 4093.82 3939.72 8033.54 154.10 1.92% 
2016 3070.07 2934.10 6004.17 135.97 2.26% 
2017 2414.25 2315.51 4729.76 98.73 2.09% 
2018 2333.08 2188.16 4521.24 144.92 3.21% 
















Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the dataset. Panel A presents the summary statistics of 
our whole sample of 104 European investment-grade companies from January 2006 to 
December 2019. Panel B presents the summary statistics for the period preceding the Small 
Bang reforms from January 2006 to May 2009. Panel C presents the summary statistics of our 
sample in the period following the Small Bang reforms, from June 2009 to December 2019. 
CDS spread is the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes of the CDS spreads (in bps). DIS is the 
minimum difference, in absolute terms, between the CDS spread and the four possible coupon 
rates (in bps). TED spread is the difference between the 3-month Euribor rate and the 3-month 
German Government BuBill (in %). CDS bid-ask spread is the difference between the ask and 
bid quotes of the CDS spreads (in bps). CDS volatility is the 30-day historical volatility of CDS 
spreads (in bps). Stock return is the monthly stock return (in %). Scaled stock bid-ask spread 
is the difference between the ask and bid quotes of the stock divided by their midpoint. Stock 
volatility is the 30-day historical volatility of stock returns (in %). 10-year risk-free rate is the 
yield on the 10-year Euro-area Government bond. Slope Yield is the difference between the 10-
year and 2-year Euro-area Government bond yields. Implied Volatility is the level of the 
VSTOXX implied volatility index. Fee is the size of the upfront payment defined as the product 
between DIS and TED spread. Scaled Fee is the size of the upfront payment divided by the 
CDS spread. Data is collected from Bloomberg. 
 
Panel A: Whole Sample (January 2006 to December 2019) 
Variable  Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev. N 
CDS spread  85.989 66.463 1380.453 3.417 75.302 17375 
DIS 29.324 22.322 380.453 0.000 32.390 17375 
TED spread 0.460 0.344 2.824 0.020 0.421 17472 
CDS bid-ask spread 6.056 5.088 101.982 0.000 3.920 17375 
CDS volatility 45.849 38.810 1006.920 4.060 29.238 17302 
Stock return 0.060 0.429 67.711 -73.129 7.881 17359 
Scaled stock bid-ask spread 0.001 0.001 0.187 -0.045 0.004 17463 
Stock volatility 27.680 23.673 401.482 2.754 15.911 17462 
10-year risk-free rate 0.019 0.017 0.046 -0.007 0.015 17472 
Slope Yield 0.010 0.011 0.022 0.000 0.006 17472 










Panel B: Pre-Small Bang Sample (January 2006 to May 2009) 
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. N 
CDS spread  75.395 45.688 1380.453 3.417 97.038 4167 
TED spread 0.659 0.514 2.824 0.020 0.718 4264 
CDS bid-ask spread 5.965 4.095 101.982 0.000 5.733 4167 
CDS volatility 61.779 53.235 1006.920 4.060 41.734 4112 
Stock return -0.997 -0.147 67.711 -73.129 9.641 4151 
Scaled stock bid-ask spread 0.001 0.001 0.037 -0.029 0.002 4255 
Stock volatility 34.192 26.842 401.482 4.683 23.769 4254 
10-year risk-free rate 0.039 0.040 0.046 0.030 0.004 4264 
Slope Yield 0.005 0.004 0.022 0.000 0.006 4264 




Panel C: Post-Small Bang Sample (June 2009 to December 2019)  
Variable  Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev. N 
CDS spread 89.332 70.555 1148.227 14.719 66.653 13208 
Fee 13.604 7.493 273.868 0.000 23.453 13208 
Scaled Fee 0.135 0.113 0.916 0.000 0.112 13208 
DIS 30.294 24.513 223.600 0.001 31.107 13208 
TED spread 0.396 0.336 1.377 0.057 0.224 13208 
CDS bid-ask spread 6.085 5.295 77.104 0.288 3.138 13208 
CDS volatility 40.883 36.840 284.510 5.100 21.788 13190 
Stock return 0.393 0.591 52.368 -62.481 7.208 13208 
Scaled stock bid-ask spread 0.001 0.001 0.187 -0.045 0.005 13208 
Stock volatility 25.582 23.025 139.188 2.754 11.607 13208 
10-year risk-free rate 0.012 0.009 0.034 -0.007 0.011 13208 
Slope Yield 0.012 0.012 0.022 0.002 0.005 13208 







Table 3 – The Effect of the Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads  
Table 3 presents the impact of the upfront fees brought about by the CDS Small Bang on CDS spreads. Column (1) 
presents results for the determinants of CDS spreads without the inclusion of the upfront fee. Column (2) presents results 
of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads using the whole sample (January 2006 – December 2009). Column (3) 
presents results of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads in the post-Small Bang sample (June 2009 – December 
2019). Column (4) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee between the Small Bang event and the end of the 
European Debt Crisis (June 2009 – July 2012). Column (5) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee after the 
European Debt Crisis (August 2012 – December 2019). The dependent variable in all models is the first difference of 
CDS spreads (∆CDS spread). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All 
estimations are carried out using firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Data is collected from Bloomberg 
for the period January 2006 – December 2019.   
 
Sample: Whole sample Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Small Bang – Debt Crisis Post-Debt Crisis 
Period Jan06-Dec19 Jan06-Dec19 June09-Dec19 June09-July12 Aug12-Dec19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    
      Constant -0.13 -0.10 -0.17  1.68 -0.68 
 [-0.20] [-0.16] [-0.29] [1.35] [-1.21] 
      
Return -0.72*** -0.71*** -0.77*** -0.99*** -0.60*** 
 [-7.19] [-8.13] [-8.64] [-5.75] [-7.74] 
      
∆Stock volatility  0.21***  0.17***  0.10**  0.05  0.12** 
 [2.91] [2.95] [2.06] [0.53] [2.51] 
      
∆CDS volatility  0.04***  0.04**  0.11***  0.13***  0.08*** 
 [2.60] [2.46] [4.49] [3.19] [3.54] 
      
∆Stock bid-ask  0.10 -0.12  0.12  0.00  0.20 
 [0.15] [-0.18] [0.20] [0.00] [0.53] 
      
∆CDS bid-ask  3.90***  3.62***  2.36***  2.36***  2.62*** 
 [6.86] [6.44] [5.58] [4.68] [4.57] 
      
∆Risk-free rate -12.12** -11.31** -4.77  2.46  3.48 
 [-2.16] [-1.96] [-0.82] [0.33] [0.35] 
      
∆Slope yield -1.79 -2.09  1.07 -2.82 -3.50 
 [-0.22] [-0.28] [0.13] [-0.31] [-0.28] 
      
∆VSTOXX  0.56***  0.41**  0.66***  1.35***  0.31** 
 [2.83] [2.20] [4.45] [4.42] [2.36] 
      
∆Fee   0.12**  0.28***  0.18***  0.74*** 
  [2.57] [4.46] [2.70] [4.92] 
      
∆Fee × SB   0.14*    
  [1.96]    
      
      Observations: 17188 17188 13189 3933 9256 
R-squared: 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.46 0.39 





Table 4 – Asymmetric Effects of the Small Bang Upfront Fee  
Table 4 presents the asymmetric effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads dependent on whether the protection buyer or 
seller pays the upfront fee. Column (1) presents results estimating the effect of the buyer paying the fee using the whole 
time-series sample. Column (2) presents results of the asymmetric effect of the buyer paying the upfront fee on CDS 
spreads in the post-Small Bang sample (June 2009 – December 2019), while Columns (3) and (4) present these results 
between the Small Bang event and the end of the European Debt Crisis (EDC) (June 2009 – July 2012), and after the 
European Debt Crisis (August 2012 – December 2019), respectively. The dependent variable in all models is the first 
difference of CDS spreads (∆CDS spread). All estimations are carried out using firm fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered by firm. Data is collected from Bloomberg for the period January 2006 – December 2019. 
Sample: Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Small Bang – Debt Crisis Post-Debt Crisis 
Period Jan06-Dec19 June09-Dec19 June09-July12 Aug12-Dec19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     Constant -0.11 -0.15  1.37 -0.46 
 [-0.20] [-0.31] [1.32] [-1.04] 
     
Return -0.65*** -0.67*** -0.82*** -0.51*** 
 [-7.60] [-8.27] [-4.94] [-6.66] 
     
∆Stock volatility  0.15**  0.10**  0.07  0.09** 
 [2.57] [2.45] [0.91] [2.17] 
     
∆CDS volatility  0.04***  0.09***  0.11***  0.06*** 
 [2.64] [4.00] [3.09] [2.75] 
     
∆Stock bid-ask -0.15  0.17  0.14  0.20 
 [-0.23] [0.31] [0.10] [0.59] 
     
∆CDS bid-ask  3.38***  2.13***  2.08***  2.33*** 
 [6.91] [5.66] [4.55] [4.97] 
     
∆10-year risk-free rate -10.02** -4.00 -0.30  3.73 
 [-2.03] [-0.82] [-0.05] [0.49] 
     
∆Slope yield -1.40  0.58 -1.86 -3.88 
 [-0.20] [0.09] [-0.26] [-0.41] 
     
∆VSTOXX  0.35**  0.49***  1.00***  0.18* 
 [2.16] [3.85] [3.76] [1.70] 
     
∆Fee -0.06 -0.64*** -0.54** -1.41*** 
 [-0.63] [-2.79] [-2.52] [-6.78] 
     
∆Fee × Buyer  0.27**  1.17***  0.94***  2.74*** 
 [2.10] [3.83] [3.31] [8.89] 
     
∆Fee × Buyer × SB  0.28***    
 [2.72]    
     
     
     Observations: 17188 13189 3933 9256 
R-squared: 0.45 0.48 0.54 0.50 






Table 5 – Impact of Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads - Distinguishing Between Financial and 
Non-Financial Firms 
Table 5 presents results highlighting the asymmetric effects of the exchange of upfront fees on CDS 
spreads written on financial and non-financial companies. Columns (1) and (2) explore the effects of 
the upfront fees on CDS spreads of financial entities for the whole time-series sample (January 2006 
– December 2019) and post-Small Bang sample (June 2009 – December 2019), respectively. Columns 
(3) and (4) explore the effects of the upfront fees on CDS spreads of non-financial entities for the 
whole time-series sample and post-Small Bang sample, respectively. All estimations are carried out 
using firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Data is collected from Bloomberg for 
the period January 2006 – December 2019.   
 
Sample of firms Financial  Financial Non-Financial Non-Financial 
Sample Period Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Whole Sample Post-Small Bang 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     Constant -0.21*** -0.16*** -0.10*** -0.13*** 
 [-6.08] [-3.72] [-2.82] [-2.68] 
     
Return -0.79*** -0.94*** -0.71*** -0.69*** 
 [-6.92] [-9.15] [-8.89] [-5.86] 
     
∆Stock volatility  0.00 -0.02  0.21***  0.13*** 
 [0.04] [-0.29] [6.45] [5.14] 
     
∆CDS volatility  0.04**  0.11***  0.04***  0.11*** 
 [2.54] [5.05] [2.72] [3.95] 
     
∆Stock bid-ask -1.07* -0.81  0.39  0.48 
 [-1.74] [-1.35] [0.72] [0.87] 
     
∆CDS bid-ask  2.97***  2.36***  3.82***  2.35*** 
 [11.60] [10.70] [10.76] [4.83] 
     
∆10-year risk-free rate -6.06*** -11.98*** -12.46*** -3.42** 
 [-3.35] [-4.58] [-7.77] [-2.09] 
     
∆Slope yield -8.84***  23.10*** -0.59 -4.20* 
 [-3.53] [4.81] [-0.41] [-1.74] 
     
∆VSTOXX  0.96***  1.52***  0.32***  0.43*** 
 [5.62] [6.78] [4.52] [4.54] 
     
∆Fee  0.17***  0.06  0.14***  0.37*** 
 [3.39] [0.58] [5.15] [5.51] 
     
     
     Observations: 3340 2520 13848 10566 
R-squared: 0.43 0.47 0.41 0.41 






Table 6 – Impact of the Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads – Differences Across Industry Sectors 
Table 6 presents the impact of the upfront fees brought about by the CDS Small Bang on CDS spreads across five different 
industry sectors, using the specification presented in Eq. (6). Column (1) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee 
on CDS spreads using the whole sample (January 2006 – December 2009). Column (2) presents results of the effect of 
the upfront fee on CDS spreads in the post-Small Bang sample (June 2009 – December 2019). Column (3) presents results 
of the effect of the upfront fee between the Small Bang event and the end of the European Debt Crisis (June 2009 – July 
2012). Column (4) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee after the European Debt Crisis (August 2012 – December 
2019). The dependent variable in all models is the first difference of CDS spreads (∆CDS spread). All estimations are 
carried out using firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Data is collected from Bloomberg for the period 
January 2006 – December 2019.   
Sample: Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Small Bang – Debt Crisis Post-Debt Crisis 
Period Jan06-Dec19 June09-Dec19 June09-July12 Aug12-Dec19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     Constant -0.11 -0.16  1.69 -0.68 
 [-0.18] [-0.28] [1.38] [-1.21] 
     
Return -0.73*** -0.77*** -0.99*** -0.60*** 
 [-8.57] [-8.64] [-5.73] [-7.69] 
     
∆Stock volatility  0.16***  0.11**  0.08  0.12** 
 [2.99] [2.25] [0.84] [2.53] 
     
∆CDS volatility  0.04**  0.11***  0.13***  0.08*** 
 [2.48] [4.43] [3.02] [3.52] 
     
∆Stock bid-ask -0.10  0.15  0.06  0.21 
 [-0.16] [0.26] [0.04] [0.53] 
     
∆CDS bid-ask  3.62***  2.31***  2.28***  2.62*** 
 [6.34] [5.58] [4.72] [4.46] 
     
∆10-year risk-free rate -11.31* -4.83 2.22  3.54 
 [-1.94] [-0.84] [0.31] [0.36] 
     
∆Slope yield -2.48  1.37 -2.58 -3.61 
 [-0.35] [0.17] [-0.29] [-0.29] 
     
∆VSTOXX  0.45**  0.64***  1.30***  0.31** 
 [2.44] [4.43] [4.47] [2.34] 
     
∆Fee × IAutomobile & Industrials 0.16** 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.72** 
 [2.35] [4.65] [3.23] [2.12] 
     
∆Fee × IConsumer Products  0.09  0.47***  0.34***  0.88*** 
 [1.36] [6.45] [5.47] [4.75] 
     
∆Fee × IEnergy 0.11* 0.33*** 0.27** 0.54** 
 [1.78] [2.62] [2.15] [2.01] 
     
∆Fee × IFinancials 0.16*** 0.14 0.04 0.82*** 
 [3.62] [1.30] [0.38] [5.22] 
     
∆Fee × ITelecoms, Media &Tech 0.20*** 0.25** 0.14 0.58*** 
 [3.89] [2.33] [1.21] [2.59] 
     
     Observations: 17188 13189 3933 9256 
R-squared: 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.39 






Table 7 – Impact of the Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads – Market-wide Analysis 
Table 7 presents the impact of the upfront fees brought about by the CDS Small Bang on CDS spreads at the aggregate 
(market) level. The time-series regression specification is presented in Eq. (7). Column (1) presents results of the effect 
of the upfront fee on CDS spreads using the whole sample (January 2006 – December 2009). Column (2) presents results 
of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads in the post-Small Bang sample (June 2009 – December 2019). Column 
(3) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee between the Small Bang event and the end of the European Debt Crisis 
(June 2009 – July 2012). Column (4) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee after the European Debt Crisis (August 
2012 – December 2019). The dependent variable in all models is the first difference in the market-wide average CDS 
spread (∆Market CDS spread). All estimations are carried out using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
HAC standard errors. Data is collected from Bloomberg for the period January 2006 – December 2019.   
Sample: Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Small Bang – Debt Crisis Post-Debt Crisis 
Period Jan06-Dec19 June09-Dec19 June09-July12 Aug12-Dec19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     Constant 0.07 0.06  1.97* -0.57 
 [0.12] [0.11] [1.92] [-1.02] 
     
Market return -1.41*** -1.35*** -1.85*** -0.83*** 
 [-5.51] [-4.84] [-4.07] [-3.61] 
     
∆Market stock volatility  0.21  0.07  0.17  0.06 
 [1.23] [0.39] [0.59] [0.35] 
     
∆Market CDS volatility  -0.03  0.06  -0.06  0.14** 
 [-0.58] [0.96] [-0.66] [2.29] 
     
∆Market stock bid-ask 0.42  2.22  -4.34  5.09 
 [0.04] [0.37] [-0.67] [0.66] 
     
∆Market CDS bid-ask  3.43***  1.74***  2.18***  1.92*** 
 [4.58] [3.37] [3.74] [2.67] 
     
∆Risk-free rate -7.15 -1.76  4.32  2.84 
 [-1.45] [-0.34] [0.64] [0.33] 
     
∆Slope yield -4.21  1.29 -2.55 -1.57 
 [-0.62] [-0.19] [-0.39] [-0.14] 
     
∆VSTOXX  -0.13  0.19  0.69*  0.19 
 [-0.54] [1.03] [1.71] [1.09] 
     
∆Market Fee  0.20*  0.56***  0.38***  0.99*** 
 [1.66] [5.86] [3.92] [3.40] 
     
∆Market Fee × SB  0.34**    
 [2.38]    
     
     Observations: 167 127 38 89 
R-squared: 0.72 0.73 0.88 0.58 
     







Table 8 – Impact of the Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads – Alternative Coupon Structure 
Table 8 presents the impact of the upfront fees brought about by the CDS Small Bang on CDS spreads if using just two 
coupons (100bps and 500bps) to derive the upfront fee. The regression specification is the same to that presented in Eq. 
(3). Column (1) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads using the whole sample (January 2006 – 
December 2009). Column (2) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads in the post-Small Bang 
sample (June 2009 – December 2019). Column (3) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee between the Small 
Bang event and the end of the European Debt Crisis (June 2009 – July 2012). Column (4) presents results of the effect of 
the upfront fee after the European Debt Crisis (August 2012 – December 2019). The dependent variable in all models is 
the first difference of CDS spreads (∆CDS spread). All estimations are carried out using firm fixed effects and standard 
errors clustered by firm. Data is collected from Bloomberg for the period January 2006 – December 2019.   
Sample: Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Small Bang – Debt Crisis Post-Debt Crisis 
Period Jan06-Dec19 June09-Dec19 June09-July12 Aug12-Dec19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     Constant -0.11 -0.18  1.69 -0.76 
 [-0.18] [-0.30] [1.34] [-1.21] 
     
Return -0.73*** -0.77*** -0.99*** -0.62*** 
 [-8.82] [-8.89] [-5.75] [-9.31] 
     
∆Stock volatility  0.17***  0.10**  0.05  0.12** 
 [2.90] [2.03] [0.54] [2.57] 
     
∆CDS volatility  0.04**  0.11***  0.13***  0.10*** 
 [2.33] [4.61] [3.21] [3.70] 
     
∆Stock bid-ask -0.14 0.09  -0.07  0.16 
 [-0.22] [0.14] [-0.04] [0.40] 
     
∆CDS bid-ask  3.47***  2.36***  2.38***  2.53*** 
 [7.18] [5.78] [4.81] [4.55] 
     
∆Risk-free rate -11.35* -4.54  2.53  3.21 
 [-1.92] [-0.76] [0.34] [0.29] 
     
∆Slope yield -2.06 0.73 -3.21 -3.38 
 [-0.28] [0.09] [-0.35] [-0.24] 
     
∆VSTOXX  0.44**  0.68***  1.35***  0.36*** 
 [2.22] [4.64] [4.54] [2.59] 
     
∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑩𝑩  0.14***  0.28***  0.19***  0.54*** 
 [4.41] [4.46] [2.96] [3.73] 
     
∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑩𝑩 × 𝑺𝑩  0.13**    
 [2.10]    
     
     Observations: 17188 13189 3933 9256 
R-squared: 0.42 0.41 0.47 0.38 
     







How does standardization affect OTC markets?  
Evidence from the Small Bang reform in the CDS market 
 
APPENDIX   
 
Table A1 – The Effect of the Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads – Alternative specification 
Table A1 presents the impact of the upfront fees brought about by the CDS Small Bang on CDS spreads using an 
alternative specification which includes interaction terms between the Small Bang dummy variable and all independent 
variables. The estimation specification is: ∆  𝑖, = 𝑖 + ∆ 𝑖, + (∆ 𝑖, × ) + ∆ 𝑖, × +∆ × + 𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,  Column (1) presents results for the determinants of CDS spreads without the inclusion of the 
upfront fee. Column (2) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads using the whole sample (January 
2006 – December 2009). Column (3) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads in the post-Small 
Bang sample (June 2009 – December 2019). Column (4) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee between the Small 
Bang event and the end of the European Debt Crisis (June 2009 – July 2012). Column (5) presents results of the effect of 
the upfront fee after the European Debt Crisis (August 2012 – December 2019). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variable in all models is the first difference of CDS spreads (∆CDS 
spread). All estimations are carried out using firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Data is collected 


















Sample: Whole sample Whole Sample 
Period Jan06-Dec19 Jan06-Dec19 
 (1) (2) 
   
Constant 0.12 0.14 
 [0.20] [0.25] 
   
Return -0.56*** -0.58*** 
 [-3.58] [-4.00] 
   
∆Stock volatility  0.29***  0.25** 
 [2.78] [2.51] 
   
∆CDS volatility  -0.00  -0.00 
 [-0.21] [-0.26] 
   
∆Stock bid-ask  -2.20 -2.68 
 [-1.14] [-1.58] 
   
∆CDS bid-ask  6.41***  6.02*** 
 [7.95] [6.88] 
   
∆Risk-free rate -16.52** -16.79** 
 [-2.19] [-2.27] 
   
∆Slope yield -8.01 -6.03 
 [-0.71] [-0.59] 
   
∆VSTOXX  0.37  0.19 
 [1.01] [0.53] 
   
∆Fee   0.09** 
  [2.39] 
   
Return ×  -0.25 -0.19 
 [-1.37] [-1.10] 
   
∆Stock volatility  ×   -0.18  -0.14*** 
 [-1.49] [-1.31] 
   
∆CDS volatility  ×   0.12***  0.12*** 
 [3.83] [3.82] 
   
∆Stock bid-ask ×   2.46 2.79 
 [1.21] [1.55] 
   
∆CDS bid-ask ×   -3.89***  -3.67*** 
 [-4.25] [-3.77] 
   
∆Risk-free rate ×  9.70 12.43 
 [1.01] [1.31] 
   
∆Slope yield ×  12.38 6.92 
 [0.86] [0.53] 
   
∆VSTOXX ×   0.42  0.47 
 [1.03] [1.21] 
   
∆Fee × 𝑺𝑩   0.19*** 
  [2.58] 
   
Observations: 17188 17188 
R-squared: 0.42 0.45 






Table A2 – The Effect of the Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads  
Table A2 presents the impact of the upfront fees brought about by the CDS Small Bang on CDS spreads. The upfront fee ( 𝑼𝑺) 
is calculated as in Equation (2) but using the US TED spread (3-month USD Libor – 3-month T-bill rate). The US TED spread 
is collected from FRED. Column (1) presents results for the determinants of CDS spreads without the inclusion of the upfront 
fee. Column (2) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads using the whole sample (January 2006 – 
December 2009). Column (3) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads in the post-Small Bang sample 
(June 2009 – December 2019). Column (4) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee between the Small Bang event and 
the end of the European Debt Crisis (June 2009 – July 2012). Column (5) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee after 
the European Debt Crisis (August 2012 – December 2019). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. The dependent variable in all models is the first difference of CDS spreads (∆CDS spread). All estimations are 
carried out using firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Data is collected from Bloomberg for the period 
January 2006 – December 2019.   
Sample: Whole sample Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Small Bang – Debt Crisis Post-Debt Crisis 
Period Jan06-Dec19 Jan06-Dec19 June09-Dec19 June09-July12 Aug12-Dec19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    
      Constant -0.13 -0.09 -0.16  1.75 -0.76 
 [-0.20] [-0.14] [-0.27] [1.36] [-1.28] 
      
Return -0.72*** -0.68*** -0.73*** -0.95*** -0.61*** 
 [-7.19] [-7.25] [-8.48] [-5.85] [-7.40] 
      
∆Stock volatility  0.21***  0.17***  0.09*  0.01  0.14*** 
 [2.91] [2.61] [1.75] [0.12] [2.62] 
      
∆CDS volatility  0.04***  0.04**  0.11***  0.13***  0.08*** 
 [2.60] [2.23] [4.40] [3.08] [3.12] 
      
∆Stock bid-ask  0.10 -0.08  0.06  -0.05  0.12 
 [0.15] [-0.12] [0.09] [-0.03] [0.33] 
      
∆CDS bid-ask  3.90***  3.67***  2.30***  2.37***  2.35*** 
 [6.86] [6.42] [5.26] [4.70] [3.48] 
      
∆Risk-free rate -12.12** -12.35** -6.18  2.42  -0.77 
 [-2.16] [-2.09] [-1.13] [0.34] [-0.07] 
      
∆Slope yield -1.79 -1.76  2.32 -2.77 1.09 
 [-0.22] [-0.21] [0.30] [-0.31] [0.07] 
      
∆VSTOXX  0.56***  0.47**  0.73***  1.46***  0.35** 
 [2.83] [2.43] [4.30] [4.89] [2.43] 
      ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺   0.09**  0.58***  0.41***  0.67*** 
  [2.34] [4.79] [2.58] [3.89] 
      ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺 × SB   0.44***    
  [3.75]    
      
      Observations: 17188 17188 13189 3933 9256 
R-squared: 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.38 






Table A3 – Asymmetric Effects of the Small Bang Upfront Fee  
Table A3 presents the asymmetric effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads dependent on whether the protection buyer 
or seller pays the upfront fee. The upfront fee is calculated as in Equation (2) but using the US TED spread (3-month 
USD Libor – 3-month T-bill rate). The US TED spread is collected from FRED. Column (1) presents results estimating 
the effect of the buyer paying the fee using the whole time-series sample. Column (2) presents results of the asymmetric 
effect of the buyer paying the upfront fee on CDS spreads in the post-Small Bang sample (June 2009 – December 2019), 
while Columns (3) and (4) present these results between the Small Bang event and the end of the European Debt Crisis 
(EDC) (June 2009 – July 2012), and after the European Debt Crisis (August 2012 – December 2019), respectively. The 
dependent variable in all models is the first difference of CDS spreads (∆CDS spread). All estimations are carried out 
using firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Data is collected from Bloomberg for the period January 
2006 – December 2019. 
Sample: Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Small Bang – Debt Crisis Post-Debt Crisis 
Period Jan06-Dec19 June09-Dec19 June09-July12 Aug12-Dec19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     Constant -0.07 -0.06  1.33 -0.52 
 [-0.13] [-0.14] [1.41] [-1.10] 
     
Return -0.60*** -0.59*** -0.74*** -0.50*** 
 [-6.39] [-7.57] [-5.26] [-5.97] 
     
∆Stock volatility  0.13*  0.06  -0.01  0.10** 
 [1.95] [1.42] [-0.17] [2.16] 
     
∆CDS volatility  0.03**  0.08***  0.11***  0.05** 
 [2.23] [3.94] [3.16] [2.38] 
     
∆Stock bid-ask -0.15  0.13  -0.29  0.16 
 [-0.22] [0.03] [-0.21] [0.51] 
     
∆CDS bid-ask  3.35***  1.98***  2.03***  2.07*** 
 [6.47] [5.21] [4.60] [3.46] 
     
∆10-year risk-free rate -11.18** -5.32 -0.75  1.35 
 [-2.11] [-1.25] [-0.13] [0.15] 
     
∆Slope yield -0.94  2.88 -0.88 -0.02 
 [-0.11] [0.54] [-0.14] [-0.00] 
     
∆VSTOXX  0.40**  0.49***  1.02***  0.19 
 [2.35] [3.69] [4.44] [1.62] 
     
∆Fee -0.10 -1.60*** -1.63*** -1.56*** 
 [-1.23] [-9.37] [-7.85] [-6.65] 
     ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺 × Buyer  0.31** 2.89***  2.76***  2.94*** 
 [2.21] [10.65] [8.47] [7.05] 
     ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺 × Buyer × SB  0.96***    
 [6.29]    
     
     
     Observations: 17188 13189 3933 9256 
R-squared: 0.45 0.53 0.59 0.50 





Table A4 – Impact of Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads - Distinguishing Between Financial and 
Non-Financial Firms 
Table A4 presents results highlighting the asymmetric effects of the exchange of upfront fees on CDS spreads written on 
financial and non-financial companies. The upfront fee is calculated as in Equation (2) but using the US TED spread (3-
month USD Libor – 3-month T-bill rate). The US TED spread is collected from FRED. Columns (1) and (2) explore the 
effects of the upfront fees on CDS spreads of financial entities for the whole time-series sample (January 2006 – December 
2019) and post-Small Bang sample (June 2009 – December 2019), respectively. Columns (3) and (4) explore the effects 
of the upfront fees on CDS spreads of non-financial entities for the whole time-series sample and post-Small Bang sample, 
respectively. All estimations are carried out using firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Data is collected 
from Bloomberg for the period January 2006 – December 2019.   
Sample of firms Financial  Financial Non-Financial Non-Financial 
Sample Period Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Whole Sample Post-Small Bang 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     Constant -0.23 -0.21 -0.11 -0.17*** 
 [-0.24] [-0.20] [-0.17] [-0.31] 
     
Return -0.80*** -0.91*** -0.70*** -0.65*** 
 [-6.86] [-6.06] [-6.37] [-7.87] 
     
∆Stock volatility  0.01 0.01  0.22***  0.11** 
 [0.06] [0.09] [2.63] [2.22] 
     
∆CDS volatility  0.04  0.10**  0.04***  0.10*** 
 [1.25] [2.40] [2.34] [3.94] 
     
∆Stock bid-ask -0.91 -0.79  0.53  0.44 
 [-0.79] [-0.87] [0.68] [0.63] 
     
∆CDS bid-ask  2.88***  2.33***  3.99***  2.26*** 
 [3.65] [3.00] [6.57] [4.91] 
     
∆10-year risk-free rate -6.64 -11.76 -13.04** -5.04 
 [-0.79] [-1.17] [-2.13] [-0.99] 
     
∆Slope yield -8.33  23.38 -0.41 -2.26 
 [-0.55] [1.34] [-0.04] [-0.34] 
     
∆VSTOXX  1.00***  1.57***  0.39**  0.54*** 
 [3.37] [4.86] [2.02] [3.60] 
     ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺  0.18***  0.15  0.10**  0.73*** 
 [3.26] [0.75] [1.97] [5.44] 
     
     
     Observations: 3340 2540 13848 10566 
R-squared: 0.43 0.46 0.39 0.40 








Table A5 – Impact of the Upfront Fee on CDS Spreads – Differences Across Industry 
Sectors 
Table A5 presents the impact of the upfront fees brought about by the CDS Small Bang on CDS spreads across five different industry sectors, 
using the specification presented in Eq. (6). The upfront fee is calculated as in Equation (2) but using the US TED spread (3-month USD Libor 
– 3-month T-bill rate). The US TED spread is collected from FRED. Column (1) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads 
using the whole sample (January 2006 – December 2009). Column (2) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee on CDS spreads in the 
post-Small Bang sample (June 2009 – December 2019). Column (3) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee between the Small Bang 
event and the end of the European Debt Crisis (June 2009 – July 2012). Column (4) presents results of the effect of the upfront fee after the 
European Debt Crisis (August 2012 – December 2019). The dependent variable in all models is the first difference of CDS spreads (∆CDS 
spread). All estimations are carried out using firm fixed effects and standard errors clustered by firm. Data is collected from Bloomberg for 
the period January 2006 – December 2019.   
 
Sample: Whole Sample Post-Small Bang Small Bang – Debt Crisis Post-Debt Crisis 
Period Jan06-Dec19 June09-Dec19 June09-July12 Aug12-Dec19 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     Constant -0.12 -0.16  1.77 -0.75 
 [-0.19] [-0.27] [1.41] [-1.28] 
     
Return -0.73*** -0.73*** -0.95*** -0.61*** 
 [-7.84] [-8.49] [-5.89] [-7.34] 
     
∆Stock volatility  0.17***  0.09*  0.03  0.14*** 
 [2.71] [1.88] [0.35] [2.65] 
     
∆CDS volatility  0.04**  0.10***  0.12***  0.08*** 
 [2.31] [4.35] [2.84] [3.18] 
     
∆Stock bid-ask 0.03  0.12  0.11  0.18 
 [0.05] [0.20] [0.07] [0.47] 
     
∆CDS bid-ask  3.73***  2.27***  2.31***  2.35*** 
 [6.58] [5.23] [4.73] [3.46] 
     
∆10-year risk-free rate -11.96** -6.55 1.86  -0.43 
 [-2.00] [-1.20] [0.26] [-0.04] 
     
∆Slope yield -2.26  2.99 -2.10 0.72 
 [-0.27] [0.40] [-0.24] [0.05] 
     
∆VSTOXX  0.50**  0.72***  1.41***  0.35** 
 [2.53] [4.32] [4.98] [2.43] 
     ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺 × IAutomobile & Industrials 0.13* 0.77*** 0.59*** 0.81** 
 [1.90] [4.89] [4.10] [2.36] 
     ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺 × IConsumer Products  0.04  0.88***  0.86***  0.80*** 
 [0.65] [6.57] [6.57] [3.75] 
     ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺  × IEnergy 0.04 0.47 0.54 0.13 
 [0.40] [1.52] [1.34] [0.36] 
     ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺 × IFinancials 0.15*** 0.29 0.01 0.81*** 
 [3.39] [1.48] [0.05] [4.41] 
     ∆𝑭𝒆𝒆𝑼𝑺  × ITelecoms, Media &Tech 0.18*** 0.30 0.15 0.35 
 [2.77] [1.59] [0.57] [1.64] 
     
     Observations: 17188 13189 3933 9256 
R-squared: 0.39 0.41 0.47 0.38 
     
 
